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The U.S. Navy's Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program (SNAP
II) is a proposed shipboard management information system (MIS)
.
By first building a basic MIS framework using a simple organi-
zational information system model and developing certain
general measures of an MIS project's impact, the SNAP II pro-
ject is analyzed. The framework allows the investigation of
MIS impact at specific organizational levels. The effect of un-
evenly distributed impact at specific levels can be significant
with regard to the overall value of the MIS. This impact might
not be anticipated by analysis of the MIS project through the
use of total organizational impact alone. The analysis of
the SNAP II project reveals two areas of concern. First, the
SNAP II system is not a true independent shipboard MIS. Second,
there are potentially detrimental undisplaced impacts, focused
at the lower levels of the shipboard organization, which may
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I. INTRODUCTION
We are in the midst of an information revolution. More
information is available to more people in less time with less
effort than ever before in history. The advances of modern
technology, especially in computers and communications, have
already reached a point where there is a surfeit of information
available. As a result, the most difficult task faced by a
potential information user is deciding which information is
of greatest value.
This information surplus effects not only individuals but
entire organizations. The speed with which information can be
collected, processed and transmitted has presented organizations
with a significant challenge in efficiently managing the flow
of information into and out of the organization. Systems for
regulating or directing the information flow can take many
forms. In the past 25 years, the use of the processing, storing
and retrieval powers of modern computer equipment has become
an intrinsic part of the efforts to control information systems
as well as the prime cause for the explosive growth of the
systems themselves.
The term management information system (MIS) has come to
represent a formal effort to deal with the vagaries of an
organization information system. What is a management infor-
mation system? In a 19 70 survey [Ref. 1: p. 16], approximately
8

half of those surveyed classified MIS as a 'thing* while the
other half considered it a process or philosophy. Many dif-
ferent definitions have been proposed. In general, they are
similar to the following description:
"a management information system is defined as the formal
configuration of human and capital resources and programs
in an organization that results in collecting, encoding,
storing, processing, retrieving, communicating, decoding,
and using data for management decisions and control."
[kef. 1: p. 16]
While not necessarily involving the use of any type of
computer facility, the general usage of the MIS term implies
a computer based information system.
A study of MIS can be made from starting points in many
disciplines. The computer basis of many MIS often results in
the topic being approached as a subset of computer science.
Others view the subject from a management or behavioral
science perspective. One thing does seem clear. Any investi-
gation which concentrates on one dimension of the MIS topic,
in isolation, is certain to have neglected many important
aspects of management information systems study.
The inherent connection between information systems and
computers may result in part from the fact that much of the
recent research in the field of MIS has come in response to
efforts to implement a computer based MIS or significantly
modify an existing automated information system. Successful
completion of such a project requires a thorough understanding
of the basic organization, the current information system
structure and the present and future information needs of

the organization. Such a detailed understanding is dictated
by the significant long term organizational investment required
by many MIS projects.
While it is not wise to view aspects of MIS in isolation,
it is also difficult and unwise to attempt an all encompassing
approach to MIS without having a framework within which to
structure and relate the results of the investigation. This
thesis will attempt to develop a general MIS framework, which
can be used as a template for more specific investigation of
particular MIS applications. In Section II, the basic struc-
ture of this framework will be explained in terms of a simple
organizational information system model. In Section III, more
specific aspects of the MIS framework will be developed involving
certain general measures with which to analyze the potential
organizational impact of an MIS project. In Section IV, an
actual MIS project proposed for implementation by the U.S.




II. BUILDING THE MIS FRAMEWORK
In any discussion of management information systems and
organizational considerations dealing with MIS design and
implementation, it is convenient to utilize a general frame-
work for management information systems. In attempting to
establish such a framework, an adaptation of Robert Anthony's
organizational planning and control framework (Ref. 2] will
be utilized.
A. ANTHONY r S ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Within the broad area of planning and control, Anthony
describes three activities: strategic planning, management
control, operational control. John Zachman presents a fine
tabular summary of Anthony's framework which is partially
reproduced as Figure 1 ptef. 3: p. 35j .
Anthony emphasizes several key points concerning his frame-
work. Strategic planning involves organizational objectives
and the formulation of policies designed to accomplish these
objectives. Management control is concerned with obtaining
and effectively using the resources necessary to accomplish
the organizational objectives. Operational control is the
"process of assuring that specific tasks are carried out ..."
pRef. 2: p. 18] .
Anthony recognizes the importance of information within


























































































































































































































































































role of "information handling" in all the activities he des-
cribes. "Information handling is the process of collecting,
manipulating, and transmitting information, whatever its use
is to be." £Ref . 2: p. 21^ •
Anthony and others who have used his work make a strong
point concerning the degree of precision in the organizational
classifications. "The lines between the categories are
blurred. .." j^Ref. 2: p. 20 ~[ . Other authors refer to the classi-
fication scheme as a continuum with the transition between the
three classifications being gradual and overlapping.
Within the context of this discussion, two aspects of an
MIS adaptation of Anthony's framework will be utilized. The
first considers Anthony's view of information handling to pro-
vide a general classification of types of handling activity.
The second concept involves a descriptive view of the input
and output of information at the three organizational levels.
B. INFORMATION HANDLING ACTIVITIES IN THE ORGANIZATION
In the very simplest sense, information handling involves
two different activities - information providing and infor-
mation using. There may be some concern at this point that
the distinction between data and information, that some authors
use, should be clarified. Information is a subjectively
ordered collection of data and the qualitative aspects of
this ordering is not important to this discussion.
Which information handling activities prevail within the
various organizational levels? It would appear that the poles
13

of the continuum, strategic planning and operational control
provide some intuitive choices of information handling activity
type. Strategic planning can be initially visualized as pri-
marily an information user while much of the activity within
the operational control level involves information providing
activities.
It is difficult to characterize the information handling
activity which corresponds to the management control level.
In fact, there is, in this area, a significant overlap of the
two basic information handling activities. Figure 2 illus-
trates this activity overlap within the management control level.
This corresponds to Anthony's description of the overlap of
planning and control activities within this organizational level
t^Ref. 2: p. 19^ • The information handling activity within
the management control level shall be referred to as infor-
mation transformation for reasons that will be subsequently
developed.
These information transformation activities can be considered
as providing a link between the two poles of the organizational
continuum. Information providing activities at the operational
control level involve specific task oriented processes. Within
this level, it is difficult to perceive the relational struc-
ture of the overall organization information resource. On the
other hand, information using activities at the strategic
planning level are involved in less structured situations which








































At this level, there may be little knowledge of, or concern
for the specific processes involved in maintaining the infor-
mation resource. To aid in this linking role, the transfor-
mation activity, it would seem, needs to be bipolar in its
focus. The central position occupied by the management con-
trol level requires this bipolarity. In the information pro-
viding flow, from the operational control level to the strategic
planning level, information is both input by and output to the
mangement control level. This one way information flow is,
however, incomplete and it is at this point that the second
aspect of the MIS framework becomes important. The hierarchical
framework which Anthony describes and which is being used in
this discussion, requires a flow of information in both direc-
tions along the organizational continuum. What is the type of
information which moves in each direction?
C. TYPES OF INFORMATION
Previously, the initial information providing activity
was associated with the operational control level of an organi-
zation. This information passed through the management
control level to the strategic planning level, the ultimate
user. From the direction of this information flow between the
organization levels and the nature of the functional activity
performed by the end user, it is not difficult to conceptualize
this information flow as being in support of the planning func-
tion of the organization. The information being communicated
in this way will be classified as planning information. In
16

this planning information flow, the management control level
uses information provided from below and provides information
to higher levels.
The exercise of control can be viewed as an information
providing process. In this regard, the flow of control infor-
mation is a downward vector in relation to the organizational
hierarchy. Thus, the strategic planning level becomes a con-
trol information provider for the management control level
which, in turn, becomes a provider for the operational control
level. Using the control information flow, management and
operational control can then be classified as control infor-
mation users. Figure 3 illustrates the complete description
of organizational information flow.
The unique position of the mangement control level is
emphasized in Figure 3. Russell Ackoff, in an oft quoted
article, lists the two most important functions of an infor-
mation system as filtration (or evaluation) and condensation
[j*ef. 4: p. B-148J . The management control level has a pri-
mary functional responsiblity for both these activities. In
the planning information flow, information generated by the
transaction based activity of the operational control level,
is combined, structured and selectively manipulated by manage-
ment control activity. More importantly, it is at his level
that the value of the organizational information resource, as
an entity, is first recognized. Accounting reports, invest-

























of the types of output of a management information system at
the management control level. This type of information handling
lends itself readily to computer based MIS and is consistent
with the accounting focus of many computer based MIS applications
The nature of control information is somewhat different.
From the strategic planning level, control information may take
the form of organization policy and objective statements or
general guidance concerning levels of organizational resources
which are or will be made available. This control information
is used by the management control level. The general or summary
information provided by the strategic planning level must be
expanded, structured and efficiently disseminated to the opera-
tional control level. The control information output of the
management control level can take many forms. Changes to
operating standards or procedures, specific skill inventory
levels, unit budgets, cost accounting standards and more are
examples of the control information output at this level. Some
of this information does lend itself to a computer based MIS
in the area of specific task support systems, while some
affects task support items such as manuals, directives or even
production equipment configuration.
It may be useful to view the flow of information, both
planning and control, as a stream of light with the management
control level acting as a prism. For the planning information
flow, the rays of the spectrum of light enter the management
control prism as an upward vector using the structure shown in
19

Figure 3. The stream of light is coalesced by the prism into
a focused beam. In the opposite direction, an aggregated beam
from above the management control prism, is refracted into
various component beams. This analyogy may provide some under-
standing of the choice of information transformation as the




III. EXPANDING THE MIS FRAMEWORK
"There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful
of success, nor more dangerous to manage than the crea-
tion of a new system. For the initiation has the enmity
of all who would profit by the preservation of the old
system and lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by
the new one".
Machiavelli "The Prince" 1513
Machiavelli' s perception of the difficulties involved
with implementing change has application to many activities
including MIS. The design and implementation of a computer-
based MIS can be conveniently examined by viewing such a pro-
ject as a change or intervention. Many changes are involved,
the most basic being the necessity for an organization to recog-
nize organizational information as a resource and view it in
relation to all organizational activities. By doing this at
the initiation of an MIS project, an organization may, for the
first time, examine in depth the internal structure and func-
tions of the organization, its subunits and its total informa-
tion needs. The quality of such an examination initially points
the way to either success or failure of the project.
The analysis of success or failure of MIS projects is also
a useful tool in the overall study of information systems.
There exists a still gowing body of evidence, from such case
studies which indicates a failure on the part of MIS designers
to consider the complete spectrum of organizational considerations
21

when formulating and implementing an MIS project. The impact
of this failure affects two general areas: organization struc-
tural relationships and the individual organizational user.
In Section II, examples of the types of information hand-
ling activities and flows, applicable to various organizational
levels, were discussed. A further examination of the activi-
ties at each level, as potential targets for computerization,
will facilitate the subsequent discussion in this section. A
complete understanding of the type of tasks performed at each
level provides a basis for evaluating the degree of support
which can be provided by a new system and indicates any required
modification to the activity processes needed to take advantage
of system computerization.
It is interesting to note, in light of the discussion in
Section II concerning the poles of the organization hierarchy,
that the operational control and strategic planning levels of
the organization provide the clearest delineation between types
of functions to be supported by a new system.
A. OPERATIONAL CONTROL LEVEL
The task oriented, well-defined processes within the
operational control level, provide an attractive and relatively
straightforward target for computerized support within an
overall MIS structure. This move to automated task support
systems is often made to take advantage of what are seen to
be significant realizable cost savings. These savings accrue
22

from the more efficient use of scarce, high cost resources,
especially personnel.
Most tasks at this level involve procedures of a routine
and repetitive nature. Simon characterizes this type of task,
in a decision context, as a programmed decision [^Ref. 5 J.
Keen and Scott Morton prefer the term structured task or
decision QRef. 6: p. 86]] . Whatever the terminology, the
essential point remains. The task process is well defined,
variation limits have been historicaly refined and task sup-
port requirements are thought to be known and obtainable
.
The benefits anticipated from implementation of a task
support system can be viewed within the context of exercising
control. As discussed in Section II, one aspect of control
was considered to be an information handling activity which
involved the provision of control information to the opera-
tional control level. In a computerized task support system,
a significant amount of this control information can be "hard-
wired" into the specific task activity support. Exercise of
control may take the form of automatic error trapping at point
of entry, step by step prompting, monitoring of data entry or
production productivity rates and others. A computerized
system allows supervisory levels to establish, modify and
monitor levels of performance and productivity and compare
them to those desired.
Many of the perceived organizational benefits anticipated
from implementation of an MIS relate to the maintenance of a
23

high quality information resource. In general, the quality
of this resource will significantly affect many of the infor-
mation handling activities at other levels of the organization.
The activities within the operational control level provide
the primary substance of the information resource.
B. STRATEGIC PLANNING LEVEL
The broad information needs of the strategic planning level
provide an excellent application for the significant computa-
tional and retrieval capability of a modern, computer-based
MIS, given the existence of a well-structured and maintained
organizational information resource. A computerized MIS can
provide accurate information in a convenient, customized and
sufficiently timely manner to support strategic planning level
activities. Given the unstructured or, at best, semi-structured
nature of activity at this level, a computerized MIS is a more
general support tool. The MIS functions supporting activity
at this level have none of the specific detailed task orienta-
tion that was previously seen in operational control level
task support systems. In fact, flexibility of performance is
a key factor in MIS support at this level. While information
handling activities at the strategic planning level may have
some commonality, there is a need for the capability to cus-
tomize certain aspects of general MIS support capabilities
on an as-needed or extended use basis. Fewer individuals will
interact with the MIS at this level. However, the nature of
their tasks allows the introduction of a significant amount of
24

individuality in the decision making process. The MIS must
be adaptable for use by these individuals.
The MIS provides a varying degree of the total information
handling support for the strategic planning level. An MIS
provides access to an internal information resource. Activi-
ties at the strategic level often involve additional use of
external information. As a result, the benefit gained from
the computerized MIS at this level pertains more to the con-
venience and ease of access to the internal information resource
rather than to the specific content of the internal information
£Ref. 7: p. 7 3 • Whether the information end user interacts
directly with the system or uses staff surrogates, the conven-
ience benefit still pertains. Regardless of the mode of inter-
action, use of the MIS at the strategic planning level requires
little change to the existing functional activities of that
level.
C. MANAGEMENT CONTROL LEVEL
Once again, when the discussion turns to the management
control level, the unique and multi-faceted information hand-
ling activities within this level become apparent. In Section
II, the information handling activity at this level was des-
cribed as information transformation. A computerized MIS can
provide significant benefit to this organization level. In
the planning information flow CFigure 3) , the structuring and
linking of various aspects of the information resource can
be greatly facilitated by some of the tools and techniques
provided by a computerized facility.
25

Many of the benefits derived from the implementation of
task support systems within the operational control level
accrue more directly to the management control level. The
increased accuracy, timeliness and scope of the information
resource results in the availability of a higher quality of
information to the management control level and eventually to
the strategic planning level in the planning information flow
structure. Thus the quality of information benefit, derived
initially from the operational control level task support
features, has application to the two organizational levels
which are the primary users of the information resource.
In the control information structure, there is also benefit
to be derived by the management control level through a com-
puterized MIS. The benefit results from the transformation of
generalized control information received by management control
and the provision of specific, transformed control information
to the operational control level. Much of the control infor-
mation received by management control is in the form of ratios
describing various large scale measures of organization perfor-
mance. Such things as desired return on investment, market
share, cost growth ceilings, anticipated capital growth and
others, can be overlayed onto historical performance data in
order to determine future or desired performance parameters
.
A computerized MIS and its associated information processing
tools provides a greatly increased capacity to apply these
ratios to the structured information resource and thereby
26

derive specific control parameters for individual functional
activities which will support the overall organization objec-
tives. This transformed control information can also provide
a convenient measure against which to gauge actual performance.
This type of measure is necessary for the specific activities
within the management control level concerned with resource
utilization and for those activities at this level which pro-
vide planning information support for the strategic planning
level.
The benefits which accure to the management control level
may require a level of change, perhaps significant, in the
activity processes within this level. Interaction with the
physical aspects of the computerized MIS is unavoidable and
can be on a frequent and repetitive basis. There are, however,
aspects of information transformation activity which do not
involve direct system interaction, for example, analysis of
data supplied by an initial information retrieval.
D. COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF AN MIS PROJECT
The previous discussion has focused in large part on the
potential benefit to be gained, at each organization level,
from computerization of the organization information system.
The cost variable must also be considered in an organization's
analysis of the efficacy of a proposed system. When analyzing
an MIS project, many cost factors are easily quantifiable.
Such things as hardware, software, physical plant alterations,
support utilities and revised levels of personnel are easily
27

transformed into actual dollar costs, some with time discount-
ing and others as lump amounts. After quantification of these
'hard* costs, there remains a variety of cost factors which
are as difficult to identify as they are to quantify. These
intangible or 'soft* costs involve impact effects resulting
from the change inherent in the implmementation of a computer-
ized MIS. Many authors have attempted to deal with this aspect
of organizational intervention but few, if any, have offered
specific recommendations beyond the level of emphasizing the
need to recognize the existence and importance of these soft
costs.
One attempt to systematize consideration of all aspects
of organizational impact associated with MIS is often referred
to as the Socio-technical Systems approach (STS) £Ref. 8J.
This methodology involves the recognition of two general sub-
systems within an oraanization - the technical system and the
social system. The technical system involves the organizational
processes, tasks and general technology. Much of the technical
system pertains to the more easily quantifiable variables of
a cost/benefit analysis. The social system pertains to the
attributes of people, their interrelationship, reward systems
and authority structures. Identification and quantification
of this type of variable in a cost/benefit analysis can provide




Even if certain soft costs are recognized, quanitification
remains a problem. This discussion will not deal with the
quantification issue. Resolution of this issue is often
organizationally dependent and has to do with valuing both
the organization's information resources and the desired level
of organizational social system stability in relation to its
effect on functional acitivity.
There remains, however, an aspect of cost/benefit analy-
sis which would appear to be an important consideration in
decisions effecting an MIS project, yet is rarely touched on
by MIS investigators. This area is best termed cost/benefit
equilibrium. It has to do with the stratification of costs
and benefits within individual organizational levels.
1. Cost/Benefit Equilibrium
Whether formally or informally, analytically of impli-
citly, MIS users will evaluate a new system based on their
perception of its impact on their functional activities.
"
. . . it is not the absolute value ... that is important but
rather the way ... (the system is) ... perceived by the poten-
tial users." £Ref. 9: p. 8 3 Many authors recognize this fact
but go on to state that a negative evaluation by a user will
result in decreased usage of the MIS facilities by the dis-
gruntled individuals. This assumes that there is an alter-
native to using the formal information system. In many appli-
cations, this is not the case. In fact, it may be that the
lack of an acceptable alternative is a prime cause of user
29

dissatisfaction. The computer-based facility provides the
only reasonable long term access to the organization infor-
mation resource. To provide for individual access to organi-
zation information resource, outside the formal MIS procedures,
would negate many of the perceived benefits of implementing
a computer-based facility.
The user's position, in the organization structure,
also has significant impact on his ability to withdraw from
interaction with the MIS. At the strategic planning level,
users can, to some extent, withdraw from direct interaction
with the formal information system. Some investigators con-
sider the delegation of interaction to staff surrogates as an
example of non-use of the MIS. While it is still important
to deal with the dissatisfaction of this user, this is not a
useful example of negative user reaction. Complete abandon-
ment of any use of the MIS by individuals at this level would
be the most illustrative user reaction. In the previous dis-
cussion, it was seen that the activities at the strategic
planning level involve both internal and external information
handling. Depending on the specific activity involved, volun-
tary abandonment of access to the internal information resource
may be a viable short term alternative for a specific user.
It is difficult, however, to consider complete isolation from
the formal MIS as an attractive or suitable long run alter-




At the other organizational levels, the lack of suit-
able alternatives to MIS use is even more acute. Forced inter-
action due to requirements of higher organizational levels is
most often the case.
Discounting abandonment, users can react in other ways
to a system which fails their personal evaluation. Inapprop-
riate behavior with regard to MIS functions is a possible
response. Increased errors, both intentional or unintentional,
incomplete data entry, attempts to cause system interruption
are all activities which may result from an adverse perception
of an MIS. Less direct effects of the imposition of a poorly
considered MIS project have recently received some investigative
attention. Personal stress, loss of self-esteem, increased
turnover rates and reduction in productivity are all effects
with probable causal relation to interaction with a computerized
MIS which is not well received by users.
This type of reaction could result from an imbalance
of costs and benefits within an individual organizational level.
It is valid to assume that the overall cost/benefit analysis
of the MIS project produced favorable results if a decision
to proceed with the project was made. It would be ideal if
there were a benefit excess situation at each organizational
level. It is unlikely, however, that even a reasoned and
well-intentioned approach to the identification and quantifi-
cation of organizational social system variables, attempts an
individual organization level comparison of costs and benefits.
Yet this type of comparison could yield valuable information.
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A typical analysis might, for example, offset costs
incurred at the operational control level by benefits which
accrue to the management control or strategic planning levels.
It is convenient to assume an altruistic attitude on the part
of the organizational workforce. That is to say, operational
control personnel are sufficiently compensated for their incur-
red costs by the knowledge that this impact is offset by a
net gain to the overall organization. Such an assumption,
however, would be naive and potentially disasterous. The
inappropriate behavior mentioned previously, may result from
the presence of undisplaced costs within a single organiza-
tional level.
What is needed is some attempt to maintain at least
a cost/benefit equilibrium within each organization level.
Overall benefit excess situations are desirable and it is not
intended that benefits be reduced merely to achieve an equili-
brium situation. The cost excess situation is the area to
which some attention must be focused.
2. Dealing with Cost Excess Situations
Within the MIS framework developed in Section II, there
exists the potential for cost excess situations. Some descrip-
tion of the general nature of activities within each organiza-
tion level was provided in previous discussion in this section.
The dollar quantifiable costs involved in an MIS project are
difficult to link to a specific level unless resources com-
mitted to the project were directly charged on a pro-rated
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basis to individual operating budgets. For an organization
wide MIS such a charge back scheme would be unusual, although
one might be able to identify level specific opportunity costs
which would result from a decision to proceed with an organi-
zation wide MIS project. When dealing with the soft impacts
of such a project, however, it is easier to identify where
certain costs and benefits specifically apply within an
organization.
In terms of a socio-technical approach, soft impacts
involve changes in the quality of work life (QWL) . Changes in
the work functions and environment will determine the new QWL.
An overall lowering of the QWL, from previous levels, would
indicate a cost excess condition just as a benefit excess
woudl result in a net increase in the QWL. Previous dis-
cussion made some implications that a cost excess condition
is most likely at the operational control level. The task
support systems prevalent at this level can require signifi-
cant changes in the level's social system. A task support
system can be designed to control or direct much of the human
operators' activity. Personal interaction between operators,
an important factor in QWL determination, is often redirected
to interaction with a terminal or to operator interaction via
a terminal. Even direct supervisors can be required to moni-
tor performance by means of machine interaction rather than
through personal contact. At least one recent labor dispute
involved, in part, the contention that human engineering of
33

CRT terminals and workstations had not recognized many of
the effects continual use of such terminals can have £Ref. 10:
p. 13.
What do personnel involved with task support systems
gain from the interaction with these system? Very little
direct or indirect benefit can be identified. Even the most
enlightened MIS designers might only be able to foster the
perception of increased operator QWL through contrivances such
as reclassification of job description (i.e., clerk to data
entry technican) or some job preparation training which includes
a level of self-esteem reinforcement. While these are accep-
table devices for a system designer to employ, they appear to
be somewhat cynical in their approach. It is doubtful that
efforts such as these could overcome the significant QWL decrease
which would result from a poorly designed system.
Figure 4 illustrates an example of an overall organi-
zation cost/benefit equilibrium situation which still exhibits
a cost excess in certain areas. This figure does not attempt
to show a dollar replacement equilibrium but rather the rela-
tive levels of soft impact variables mentioned previously.
Figure 5 shows how, even in an overall benefit excess condition,
a cost excess situation can still exist. Likewise, Figure 6
shows an overall cost excess condition with an area of benefit
excess. It is possible to imagine that even in the situation
illustrated by Figure 6, a decision to proceed with an MIS
project could be made since the perception of the MIS project
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by those making this decision might be biased by a locally
focused benefit excess situation.
3. Manipulating Cost/Benefit Levels
Figure 4 can be used to graphically illustrate various
approaches to dealing with a cost excess situation. If the
right side of the benefit line were moved upward, holding the
left side generally in place, the cost excess is reduced by
an overall increase in derived benefit as shown in Figure 7.
It may be possible to increase the derived benefit line only
within the specific organizational level desired, resulting in
a kinked benefit line as shown in Figure 8
.
It is more likely, however, that any increase in bene-
fit, even if directed at a specific level, will result in
some benefit increase at ether levels of the organization.
For example, actions which increased derived benefits at the
operational control level may result in a high quality infor-
mation resource which, in turn, will result in some benefit
increase at other organization levels.
The complimentary approach to increasing benefit is to
decrease cost. Reduction of the overall cost and reduction
of cost within specific levels is possible with similar graphic
results as shown in the benefit increase examples. However,
it is a possiblity that by reducing costs, of the type being
discussed, certain elements of the system which contribute
to the level of derived benefit may be affected. This would
be especially true if the action to reduce costs resulted in
a less capable overall system.
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Certainly the situation represented in Figure 5 pre-
sents an attractive atmosphere for a favorable MIS project
decision. The real problem results from the fact that with
the focus of cost excess at the operational control level,
the quality of the organization information resource is
threatened. Much of the benefit expected from implementation
of the MIS project is based on assumptions concerning the
quality of that information resource. This localized cost
excess situation may, in fact, undermine the very foundation
of the organization's information system.
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IV. APPLYING THE MIS FRAMEWORK
A. SHIPBOARD NON-TACTICAL ADP PROGRAM
This section will discuss the proposed implmementation
of a non-tactical data processing system aboard U.S. Navy
ships. The program is called the Shipboard Non-tactical ADP
program or SNAP and the specific shipboard application to be
discussed is known as SNAP II. The integrated functional des-
cription for SNAP II describes this system as a shipboard MIS
[Ref. 11: p. 2-l3 . SNAP II has been conceived in partial
response to Chief of Naval Operations Objective Number 5,
which is: "To reduce the administrative burden on the fleets."
[Ref. 11: p. 2-2]
The intent of SNAP II is to automate certain manual func-
tions performed in support of formal Navy adminstrative pro-
grams or procedures. The initial implementation of SNAP II
system will support various aspects of the Navy's Material
Maintenance Management C3M) system, supply support and person-
nel administration. Hardware and standard application software
will be provided to each user ship in conjunction with an as
yet unspecified level of training and conversion support. An
important feature of the justification for expenditures in
support of SNAP II is that no additional shipboard personnel




The initial discussion in this section will address
several preliminary areas before proceeding to an alaysis of
the proposed shipboard MIS with relation to the framework
developed in Sections II and III. These preliminary areas
involve the following questions:
(i) How does the shipboard organization relate to
Anthony's three level organizational framework?
(ii) Is SNAP II, as conceived, a shipboard management
information system?
1. Shipboard Organization
A commissioned Navy ship is a unit unique in all the
military. Among the over 400 such vessels presently in ser-
vice, there is a wide range of size, mission, external command
hierarchy and everyday activity. The overall Navy command
recognizes a Navy ship as an independent activity in many ways
The head of the shipboard organization, the commanding
officer, holds a unique and highly sought postion within the
Navy. His authority and responsiblity are wide ranging and,
in certain instances, total. The rest of the shipboard organi-
zation conforms closely to the classic hierarchical organiza-
tion structure as illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. It is
important to realize that both these figures apply to the
same ship. The two figures point out the duality of activity
which exists in the shipboard environment.
Figure 9 represents the shipboard organization as rela-
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While the example structure shown most closely approximates
a combatant such as a destroyer or frigate, any differences
from other ships involves only a different emphasis in mission
which may increase the importance and size of one department
and/or result in a different title for one or more of the
departments. The basic relational structure remains the same.
Figure 10 represents the administrative organization
aboard ship in conjunction with the routine activities and
functions which are performed at various levels and which
support the capability of carrying out the primary combat sup-
port role. Under the operational structure, the lowest levels
of the organization, known as divisions, are an amalgamation
of different but related skill areas. The collective function
of each division concerns a specific aspect of the ship's
operational mission as a combat or combat support platform.
Such tasks as servicing and directing main batteries, detect-
ing and tracking targets, and manuvering and navigating the
ship are operationally oriented tasks supported by the opera-
tional organization in Figure 9.
The administrative structure further divides the
division level of the operational organization into subdivisions
known as workcenters. In the administrative organizations,
the divisions themselves are known as workgroups as shown in
Figure 10. The workcenters are distinguished by skill area.
Many workcenters contain only one type of skill, maintenance
of shipboard equipment, administrative processing and logistic
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support are examples of tasks supported by the administrative
organization illustrated in Figure 10.
Both organizational representations are essentially
identical down to the department level and in many cases to
the division/workgroup level. Two types of operational to
administrative relations may exist below these levels. First,
many workcenters perform support functions related directly
to equipment and systems for which they also have the responsi-
bility of operating in their mission related role. Second,
certain workcenters perform a true service support role with
regard to systems and equipment which may be operated by other
personnel or which support all mission related functions (i.e.,
electrical power, environmental conditioning, food service,
supply support, etc.).
The SNAP II system would be aimed at the administra-
tive structure of the shipboard organization. How and where
does this shipboard organization coincide with Robert Anthony's
organizational framework as described in Section II? The
workcenter level of the shipboard organization corresponds
to Anthony's operational control level. The task oriented
nature of the workcenter organization strongly supports this
classification.
The transition to the management control level would
appear to start no lower than the workgroup level and more
correctly at or just above the department level. The exact
transition is determined by the level in the organization
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where the interrelationship between tasks performed by the
different departments becomes more important than the actual
tasks performed by a specific department. It seems apparent
that the commanding officer is to be considered within the
management control level at the very least. There remains
the potential argument that the commanding officer corresponds
more closely to the strategic planning level of Anthony's
framework. Gorry and Scott Morton's adaptation of Anthony's
framework ERef. 12 3 provides some convenient measures against
which to consider the applicablity of the strategic planning
level designation to the shipboard organization.
Among several factors they use to differentiate
Anthony's three levels, one stands out clearly in support of
considering the strategic planning level as external to the
shipboard organization. The time horizon variable applicable
to the commanding officer of a ship would not appear to com-
pare with that which Gorry and Scott Morton use when discussing
strategic planning. Ship commanding officers are assigned to
their position for a fixed tour length, approximately two
years. This time period is known by all concerned and is
driven by the need to provide a command opportunity for as many
qualified officers as possible while still allowing a signi-
ficant period within which an individual can demonstrate his
ability to perform. Much of the shipboard resources, both in
terms of funds and personnel, are available to the commanding
officer for periods ranging from one year to 18 months. While
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the decisions that a commanding officer makes can have long
range impact, the primary decision inputs such as fiscal
year budge constraints, junior officer rotation cycles and
others, dictate a shorter terra planning horizon.
A commanding officer has little input in determining
the level of resources provided to his ship. His responsi-
bility, instead, is focused on the efficient utilization of
the resources provided. This, too, supports placing the com-
manding officer within the management control level of Anthony's
framework according to Gorry and Scott Morton's measures.
This does not mean that both Anthony's framework and
the MIS framework developed in Section II have no meaning in
the shipboard environment. What it does mean is that in
order to utilize these frameworks it is necessary to view the
shipboard organization as part of a larger organization rather
than as a discrete, independent organizational entity.
2. SNAP II as an MIS
Based on the preceding section it can be seen that the
strategic planning/management control level transition point
is external to the shipboard organization. Therefore, a so-
called shipboard MIS should be viewed as a segment of a larger
organizational information system, It is not important for
the purposes of this discussion to further identify the exact
transition point. It is crucial that the dependent non-discrete




The previous section has, in fact, answered the ques-
tion about the designation of a SNAP II system as a shipboard
MIS. The SNAP II system is part of a larger organizational
information system. The information resource, to which a
SNAP II system provides input and access, is not unique to a
specific ship and can be accessed by organizational units
external to the shipboard organization. To better understand
the role of a SNAP II system within a larger system, some
specific activities intended for the initial SNAP II implmen-
tation must be examined. The maintenance portion of the initial
SNAP II configuration will be used in this example.
It is currently intended that the SNAP II system will
automate the shipboard entry and update of maintenance report-
ing and documentation under the maintenance data system (MDS)
.
At the present time, all such documentation is initially
created manually by shipboard maintenance personnel usually at
the work center level. Individual maintenance documents form
the significant portion of a shipboard maintenance data base
known as the Current Ships' Maintenance Project (CSMP) . There
is some existing computer support for the manual shipboard
system. This support is provided by external activities and
involves keyed entry of the manual shipboard documents into
a larger maintenance data base which includes many ships.
Each ship receives automated printouts of the portions of this
larger data base which pertains. These printouts are pro-
vided on a periodic basis in order that the ship can validate
the data and ensure all appropriate entries have been made.
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Many organizations, external to the ship, make use
of the all inclusive data base for the collation, correlation,
data extraction of historical maintenance history. This
information has application to those Navy organizational levels
concerned with determining the effectiveness and efficiency of
operational equipment, operational support equipment and the
level of maintenance and logistic support required for these
equipments. Prediction of failure rates, mean time to repair,
relations between on-hand parts inventories and specific parts
requirements and many other measures are derived in some part
from the information resource developed through the manual
preparation of shipboard documents. The SNAP II system pro-
poses use of computer supported preparation of shipboard docu-
ments through interactive use of a cathode ray tube (CRT)
terminal located in the individual workcenters . The system
would prompt the users through document preparation, provide
automatic input of certain universal information (i.e., ship
name, identification codes, etc.), conduct validity checks
on user entered data and enter the data into the shipboard
data base for access, modification or other purposes as
necessary. The current data base will be provided to appro-
priate external activities for update of the overall mainten-
ance data base. The SNAP II system will also provide for
interface of the shipboard maintenance data base with other
shipboard data bases; most importantly, the supply data base.
In this way, the status of supply support for specific
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maintenance actions can be determined by maintenance personnel.
The supply data base is also updated in terms of the parts
requirements for specific maintenance actions. It is expected
that this type of shipboard interface will improve the manage-
ment of maintenance aboard ship. The maintenance subsystem of
SNAP II is also expected to provide more accurate, timely and
complete maintenance data and reduce the maintenance related
administrative burden on shipboard personnel.
The implementation of the SNAP II system requires a
significant change in the functional activities of the ship-
board administrative organization. In the maintenance sub-
system, the change involves the shift of the data entry point
to the workcenter/workgroup level. This is the same level which
was previously shown to be most closely related to the operational
control level of the organizational framework.
In a 1973 article, Cyrus Gibson and Richard Nolan postu-
lated various stages in the growth of data processing capa-
bility within an organization £Ref. 13 ] . This hypothesis was
based on actual studies of a number of organizations. Nolan
provided measures by which an organizations location within
one of the stages of DP growth could be estimated. The import-
ance of this information concerns the ability to make approp-
riate decisions effecting future organizational DP growth
and maturation. In general, the hypothesis states that early
DP capabilities involve the creation of an organization infor-
mation resource and proceeds in an evolutionary way to more
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specific and higher level uses of this resource within the
organization.
It would appear that the Navy organizational infor-
mation system of which the shipboard organization is a part
has followed an evolutionary course opposite of that postu-
lated by Nolan. The strategic planning and management control
levels of the Navy information system have had computer sup-
port for a number of years but have been using that capability
to draw on an information resource which is initially created
through completely manual procedures. The specific form of
these manual procedures are significantly dictated by the infor-
mation requirements of the external activities' computer-
based information handling systems. The design and implemen-
tation of a computer-based shipboard system will also be largely
defined by the configuration and requirements of the existing
external system.
The effects of such a reversed system evolution are
difficult to predict. There may be no detriment to the imple-
mentation of the SNAP II system. It is important, however,
for those tasked with the design and installation of SNAP II
to understand that a certain degree of flexibility of choice
has been eliminated by the apparent reversal of the evolution-




B. COST/BENEFIT EQUILIBRIUM IN THE SNAP II SYSTEM
The Automated Data Systems (ADS) Development plan for
SNAP II [jRef. 14^was one of the documents prepared during the
program justification phase of the SNAP II program. It con-
tains a very useful summary of the cost/benefit analysis per-
formed in conjunction with the SNAP II Project. The document
cites several pilot studies done prior to 1979 under the
aegis of several different projects which preceded SNAP II.
It lists a dollar cost breakdown of SNAP II requirements
Qtef. 14: p. 1-8 3 . These costs refer solely to hardware,
software and associated equipment procurement, operation and
maintenance. The benefits anticipated from the implementation
of SNAP II are broken down by individual subsystems. The bene-
fits are not dollar quantified £Ref. 14: pp 8-1,8-9 J . The
only attempt at benefit quantification involves estimates of
time savings to be realized by automation of specific shipboard
administrative tasks. These estimates are based on the previous
pilot studies using individual task support modules of a SNAP II
like system aboard test platforms for varying periods of time.
There is no discussion as to the similarity of the automated
procedures used during these tests to the automated procedures
proposed for SNAP II other than that they involve the same sub-
system tasks. There is a substantial time savings shown for
the use of an automated support system over a strictly manual
system. The manhour savings shown by these tabular comparisons
do not equate to a potential reduction in shipboard personnel
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levels. The savings is expected to be realized in ability
to redirect previously committed manhours to other shipboard
tasks.
The subject of soft costs or similar impacts of SNAP II
implementation is never discussed. All mention of changes
which will effect the shipboard organization are couched in
benefit terms. These benefits, for the most part, fall in
the category of increased accuracy, timeliness and complete-
ness of information. "...the primary value of ADP systems is
the aggregation of data into useful information for the ship-
board manager which can be used for the timely solution of
complex problems." £Ref. 14: p. 1-3 J The aggregation of data
mentioned in the SNAP II documentation would appear to indi-
cate the type of information handling activity previously
classified as information transformation and identified with
the management control level of the MIS framework. The bene-
fit associated with this information capability, provided by
SNAP II, requires no significant change in the functional
activity of the shipboard manager.
Those benefits which can be ascribed to the operational
control level of the shipboard organization, by the SNAP II
designers, appear to be based on several implicit assumptions.
Continuing the maintenance subsystem example, these assumptions
become clearer. First, the workcenter individual, utilizing
the system for entry of a required maintenance action, bene-
fits from the reduced time required for completion of this
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task. The reduced administrative time allows this individual
to apply additional effort to other tasks, hopefully more
operationally oriented. This may, in fact, result in benefit
to the overall organization but it is difficult to support
the notion that this benefit is of importance to the opera-
tional control level individual. Higher level shipboard mana-
gers will actually derive most of this benefit in terms of
increased flexibility and capacity to schedule operationally
oriented tasks. The operational control level personnel will
merely substitute a new task for an old one and, in addition
will be available for additional duties. That such personnel
will view this as a benefit is not entirely obvious.
The second underlying assumption has to do with the frame
of reference used to derive the time savings figures antici-
pated from use of a tutorially prompted data entry system to
replace the manual preparation of a maintenance document.
Manual preparation of this type of form currently requires a
certain level of reference search prior to preparation. The
reference material required to be searched can be extensive
and so the ability to conduct such a search through use of
an interactive terminal would be very helpful to the individual
concerned. However, the extensive nature of this documenta-
tion also presents a significant problem to the designer of
an automated system. Continuous on-line availability of all
possible reference documentation to support potential mainten-
ance actions would require an enormous storage capacity. If
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the entire data base is not to be continuously on-line then
completion of the data entry task may require determining which
segment of the data base is required and operator intervention
in order to mount the proper segment. This situation also
presents the possiblity of competition among users for dif-
ferent segments of the required data base.
The third assumption concerns the level of key stroke
speed and reading comprehension variances among potential
system users. Many of the times used for completion of tasks
using the automated system were derived from narrowly based
studies which used a limited number of personnel. The simi-
larity between these test groups and the potential shipboard
user population was not discussed in the documentation which
calculates potential time savings using a SNAP II type of task
support system. All aspects of manual data entry must be con-
sidered when determining the time savings which result from
automation of the task. That this was done is not clear from
the references.
The final assumption is, perhaps, the most troublesome.
One aspect of the maintenance data system is a very high docu-
ment error rate, as much as 40 percent in some reports. These
errors result from poor or incomplete preparation of the
required maintenance documents . Erroneous documents are
rejected at the point of initial submission by external main-
tenance managers and are not entered into the automated main-
tenance data base. These rejected documents must be corrected
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by shipboard personnel and resubmitted. This time-consuming
process often impacts the levels of outside maintenance sup-
port provided to the individual workcenter involved. This is
a frustrating and demotivating situation for many shipboard
personnel especially if it is perceived, however incorrectly,
that the errors resulted from inaccurate supporting documen-
tation provided to the workcenter. The SNAP II justification
documentation anticipates a greater than 50 percent reduction
in this type of error £Ref. 14: p. 8—3 31 • This estimate is
based on the availability of automatic lookup of certain
required data elements and validity/error rejection at point
of entry. The SNAP II implementation does not propose a pre-
installation update and validation of the shipboard configura-
tion and supporting documentation. Merely indentifying errors,
without forcing correction would not result in the initial
error reduction anticipated by SNAP II designers, although the
desired reduction in errors could eventually be achieved.
Regardless of the timing of the attainment of reduced
error rates, a reduction in errors is assumed to be of benefit
to the shipboard organization due to the increased level of
external maintenance assistance resulting from the more timely
submission of error free maintenance requests. This requires
that there be a capability for increased external maintenance
support. A 1978 study of the maintenance system in San Diego
reported that of those maintenance requests which passed the
initial error screening, 42 percent were subsequently rejected
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or cancelled. Of those, 73 percent were rejected due to a
lack of maintenance capacity or capability on the part of
outside maintenance activities £,Ref. 15: p. 20 33 •
There is no doubt that some of the anticipated results
of the implementation of SNAP II would provide benefit, not-
withstanding the problems of predicting the amount of such
benefit. The SNAP II designers consider the predicted benefits
to be focused at the shipboard organization. As discussed,
much of the benefit actually accrues at organizational levels
external to the ship. This could result in some secondary
benefits to the ship but such a connection would be difficult
to identify and be significantly displaced in time from the
occurrence of the related costs so as to further disguise the
connection. Even those benefits which do accrue to the ship
apply most often to the management control level of the ship-
board level. It has been shown that management control does
not correspond to any shipboard level below that of a depart-
ment. The cost aspects of the SNAP II system, however, are
most concentrated at levels below the department, i.e., the
operational control level.
C. ENSURING SNAP II COST/BENEFIT EQUILIBRIUM
Based on the previous discussion, it seems likely that
the implementation of a SNAP II like system aboard a Navy
ship would result in a cost excess situation at the operational
control level of the shipboard organization. It is encumbent
on the system designers to make an effort to alleviate this
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condition in order to facilitate a successful implementation
of the system and ensure that anticipated benefits are realized.
These efforts can be applied during both the system design
and system installation phases of the project.
1. Reducing Cost Impact During Design
The level of soft cost is a difficult variable to mani-
pulate in the design phase. As has been shown, SNAP II is a
segment of a larger organizational information system. No
significant overall organizational modifications are antici-
pated as part of the SNAP II project. Many of the SNAP II pro-
cedural activities are based on existing regulations and require-
ments. The objectives of the SNAP II system must conform to
these existing boundaries. The required upward compatibility
of the SNAP II system with the other segments of the overall
information system will dictate specific formats and entry
methods for SNAP II users.
This is not to say that cost reduction cannot be achieved
through careful design. To do this requires a complete under-
standing of what formal requirements must be met along with
the formal and informal shipboard methods currently used to
meet these requirements.
Some basic considerations for cost reduction features
of a SNAP II design are:
a. Less Arbitrary Error Identification
Design features which attempt to meet the increased
accuracy objective must be evolutionary. No assumptions that
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entirely correct information is available to system user should
be considered for initial system design. A more realistic
objective for initial system design would be identification of
sources of incorrect or invalid data entry. Error trapping
or validity checking routines, which absolutely prevent fur-
ther system use for the current task, should be avoided. Excep-
tion listings/error flagging routines would increase the users'
perception of a 'friendly' system while still providing the
substantial benefit of error source identification. (NOTE:
The above procedure illustrates the reduction of overall bene-
fit which can occur when attempting to reduce a cost excess
situation by manipulating the cost variable. This topic was
discussed in Section III.)
b. Avoiding User Competition for System Resources
Design features should attemp to avoid user com-
petition for system services or data. Source data should be
sufficiently and uniquely segmented so as to allow multiple
concurrent user access to required source or reference data.
This segmentation involves both the software design and the
hardware configuration. For example, the capability to copy
entire segments of the master data base into local 'scratch
pad' storage for use during an entire user interaction would
decrease the competition/contention situation which can give
an 'unfriendly' perception of the system.
c. Maintain System Availability
System configuration design must provide for
essentially zero probablity of complete system unavailability.
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The type of functions to be performed by the SNAP II system
cannot be entirely halted in the case of system failure.
Designers may tend to rely on manual procedures to provide
system backup and functional continuance during system inter-
ruption. The extent of manual backup such as routine hardcopy
production of transactions to date and significant manual
entry of accumulated data after system restoration, can quickly
reduce the time savings benefit expected from the system if
system availability is low. Hardware redundancy, such as might
be provided by independent but linked microcomputer-based work
stations, can allow a high level of system hardware avail-
ability when compared to a single processor system. The prob-
ability that some system capability will be available at any
time with a multiple microprocessor system, is very high since
there is no single component or assembly which renders the
entire system inoperative. A combination system which uses
microprocessor-based work stations with attached storage devices,
such as floppy disk drives, for front end data entry to a
larger main processor could also be used. The transport-
ability of both hardware and data storage media in a micro-
computer system provides significant flexibility to the user
by allowing him to maintain system access despite either anti-
cipated or unanticipated interruptions at his primary work
station. The larger processor provides the necessary capa-
bility to maintain the entire data base and coordinate the
networking of the peripheral work stations . Should the main
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processor be unavailable, the individual work stations retain
some data entry and retrieval capability. After restoration
of the main processor, update can be accomplished efficiently
and without significant user inconvenience.
2 . Increasing Benefits Through Design
In Section III, reducing costs in an effort to alle-
viate a cost excess situation was discussed as one of two ways
to approach the problem. Increasing benefits is another possi-
ble method. These marginal benefits can be focused at one
specific level of the organization; hopefully, that level
experiencing the cost excess. Alternatively, it may be possi-
ble to take action which raises the general benefit level of
the whole organization. Examples of specific benefit increas-
ing actions which apply to the SNAP II system may include:
a. Automation of Alternative Subsystems
Automation of manually based subsystems with greater
realizable benefit to the shipboard organization should be
considered in addition to those planned for the initial SNAP II
configuration. Automation of the Planned Maintenance Svstem
(PMS) , for example, mav serve to facilitate initial user accept-
ance of the entire svstem. The PMS program directlv involves
all levels of the shipboard organization. The information
base for PMS has less external interface than other subsystems
currently planned for the initial SNAP II configuration. Those
external contacts which do exist act more in support of the
shipboard PMS program rather than relying on the shipboard
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organization for support of an external system. For the most
part, any externally required information related to the PMS
program, is reported through MDS procedures. An automated
PMS facility would allow the more efficient flow of control
information concerning the scheduling and performance of
minimum levels of maintenance for operational and operational
support equipment. The increased benefit to be gained by the
operational control level, from automating PMS, would be as
a result of the facilitated access and use of this control
information by task-oriented individuals. For example, an
automated PMS task support system could provide a maintenace
man with a single source of information concerning required
tools, consumables^ special precautions and parts needed to
perform a required maintenance action. In fact, the automated
scheduling of this specific maintenance activity could lead
to an early identification of support material which is not
currently available and could maintain a delivery status of
this material after automatically producing a requisition. In
this way, the individual charged with the performance of a
maintenance action will be able to anticipate problems associ-
ated with completing the action as scheduled and take approp-
riate and timely action to reschedule the maintenance. The
benefit of the more timely, complete, and convenient informa-
tion is more directly focused at the operational control level




b. General User Support Features
Alternative forms of support which have intrinsic
value to individuals at specific organizational levels can
increase the favorable perception of the automated system by
the user. Computer-aided instruction modules for professional
advancement, general education advancement (high school equiva-
lency, etc.) and basic shipboard or military indoctrination
could serve to increase the overall perceived usefulness of
the automated system at the level which is experiencing a cost
excess situation. Even the purely recreational capabilities
of the automated system including video games should not be
overlooked as a potential source of user satisfaction.
In general, any design aspects which facilitate
user interaction with the overall system on a voluntary basis
and result in real or perceived benefit to the user while
still supporting the primary program objectives, should be
viewed as a potential method in ensuring a total organization
cost/benefit equilibrium.
3 . Reducing Cost During Installation
Installation considerations have been divided into four
categories. The most common aspect of these considerations
has to do with lessening those initial installation impacts
which may translate into user dissatisfaction and contribute
to a localized cost excess situation at individual organiza-









During transition from the manual to the automated
system, users cannot be expected to be idle and available
only for system installation support tasks. As was pointed
out the dual shipboard organization is imposed on a single
group of individuals. These individuals have extensive responsi-
bilities and duties placed on them under both organization
structures. Transition activities will be significant and
require the complete attention of those involved. It would
be convenient to assume that no other requirements can or will
compete for user attention during transition but this is not
a realistic assumption.
System installation schedules must take into account
the operational status and overall schedule parameters of each
individual unit. Installation should be officially scheduled
through the operational and organizational hierarchy approp-
riate to the unit. Specific levels of shipboard involvement
should be specified and promulgated for all concerned organi-
zational levels to be aware of in advance. In addition, instal-
lation 'lessons learned 1 acquired from previous installations
must be quickly assimilated into the installation process and
scheduling criteria for remaining installations.
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External teams which provide specialized assist-
ance, including routine clerical functions, and which can
lessen some of the installation burden on user personnel, would
provide more flexibility to schedulers in selecting specific
installation time periods,
b. System Training
The SNAP II system objective which provides that
no additional, specifically trained operator or maintenance
personnel be required by the system, imposes an implicit
requirement that well-structured, comprehensive training be
provided to existing personnel. Most important is the
training of shipboard personnel who will, themselves, be
trainers. These individuals will also serve as system advo-
cates during the initial phases of system use and as such
must not only have a complete understanding of the system but
also possess the personal tools with which to pass on that
understanding
.
The wide use of a system like SNAP II, throughout
the Navy, would also dictate that some general introductory
or reinforcement training be provided in any Navy educational
effort which concerns functional activities covered by the
SNAP II system and personnel who are potential SNAP II users.
Assist teams, available on user request, should
be established to respond as necessary to support efficient
operation of the SNAP II system. It is important that these
teams be for user support only and not a means for higher
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authority to investigate a specific units ' performance with
regard to SNAP II interaction,
c. System Maintenance
The maintenance of a SNAP II system involves two
distinct areas, hardware maintenance/reliability and software
update
.
(1) Hardware Maintenance/Reliability . Many sys-
tem features relating to hardware maintenance and reliability
were discussed under system design considerations. Given the
restriction against additional, specifically trained mainten-
ance personnel, the ease and timeliness of required mainten-
ance actions must be supported by well prepared documentation
and sufficient levels of spare components. Part kits for
high failure rate elements and entire assembly spares for
critical components must be available to the user organiza-
tion at the time of installation. Historical failure rates
should be used to dynamically reconfigure onboard spares from
an original worst case scenario support level. This method
is preferred to a most optimistic case procedure which would
require gradual buildup of onboard spares after the fact.
Low levels of initial hardware availability will hamper all
other efforts aimed at ensuring initial system acceptance by
users.
(2) Software/Data Base Update . The nature of
the activities supported by the SNAP II system will require
periodic and often significant updates to those portions of
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the SNAP II data base provided by external activities. Price
changes, stock and part number changes, updated maintenance
requirements and many others will require update of the data
base and software on a regular basis. These updates must be
able to be accomplished by users without resulting in a major
impact on existing user data bases. When such impact is
unavoidable, those necessary changes to the user data base
should be specifically identified as part of the update pro-
cess. For example, a part number change should, after entry,
cause all outstanding requisitions and maintenance actions
affected to be identified and supporting documentation pre-
pared as necessary.
d. System Operation
The SNAP II system has the potential to provide
more convenient access to shipboard information by external
activities. Those portions of the overall shipboard infor-
mation resource required to be available to external activities
are similar to that which are currently available under the
manual based system. Additional access by external activities
should be discouraged. A system viewed by the shipboard organi-
zation as a 'hole in the tent* for external activities will
result in significant user dissatisfaction and a generally
unfavorable perception of the personal usefulness of the sys-
tem. This type of situation emphasizes the need for those
charged with the development of SNAP II to view the target
shipboard organization as part of a larger organization when




SNAP II is a potentially valuable addition to the existing
capabilities of the U.S. Navy non-tactical information system.
The quality of the underlying information resource, upon which
the Navy MIS is built, will be directly affected by the way
in which SNAP II is merged with the current information system.
At the present time, the apparent failure on the part of SNAP II
advocates to recognize the dependent position of SNAP II within
the total organization framework threatens the success of
SNAP II introduction. A SNAP II disaster places even the
current level of benefit, derived from the existing Navy MIS,
in serious jeopardy.
In no SNAP II document is favorable user perception a
stated objective in itself. The current approach limits the
benefits, which users may derive, to those which result within
the specific SNAP II subsystems, such as the maintenance sub-
system example used in this section. As was discussed, it
is often the case that the anticipated benefit does not apply
to the user for whom it is and should be intended. By speci-
fying a favorable user perception objective, the SNAP II
designers are not constrained by boundaries of the existing
subsystems. This concept may be best implemented by intro-
ducing a subsystem known as shipboard support which specific-
ally addresses the user perception objective. Within this
subsystem, the shipboard organization would be provided the
capability and flexibility to utilize the basic SNAP II system
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features to develop local, unique applications. This subsystem
would not interfere with the other, more externally oriented,
subsystems but would support the objectives of these sub-
systems by increasing favorable user perception of the entire
system.
SNAP II is not a true shipboard management information
system. However, using the capabilities provided by a ship-
board support subsystem, a valuable tool for use in the manage-
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